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Abstract 
Conventional wisdom suggests that increases in public information improve market liquidity. 
However, if greater public information incentivizes only sophisticated investors to produce 
private information, it could exacerbate information asymmetry among investors and thus 
reduce liquidity. We explore this argument on a sample of mortgage-backed securities 
(MBSs) by using a recent European regulation that mandates complex disclosures about the 
individual loans underlying MBSs. We find that the liquidity of the debt tranches of 
disclosed MBSs declines by 23% post-regulation. Our inferences are stronger when the 
securities are harder to value and when the disparity in investor sophistication is higher. In 
contrast to these findings, we also find that the disclosures increase the liquidity of the 
equity tranches of the same MBSs. Overall, our evidence implies that the liquidity impact 
of enhanced public information varies with the nature of the asset in question; this effect is 
likely a function of the investors’ incentives for information production and price discovery. 
JEL classification: G10, G21, G23, G28. 
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1. Introduction 
This study examines the impact of public information on the secondary-market liquidity of 
information-insensitive securities. A financial asset is said to be information-insensitive if 
investors’ incentives to produce private information about the asset are low and if it is common 
knowledge that producing such private information is unprofitable. Information-insensitivity is 
critical for debt markets that aim at funding—such as repos, treasuries, asset-backed commercial 
papers, and asset-backed securities (ABSs)—rather than markets that aim at price discovery—
such as stock markets. This is because information-insensitivity allows financial institutions and 
corporations to execute large trades quickly without undertaking costly information-gathering 
efforts. In turn, preserving liquidity in these markets is of paramount importance for the stability 
of debt funding, and thus, the well-functioning of financial systems (e.g., Gorton, 2012; Gorton 
and Metrick, 2012). 
Meanwhile, following the global financial crisis, many observers called for regulations that 
increase the quantity and quality of public information in funding markets, especially in the 
securitization domain (Jackson, 2010; Gilson and Kraakman, 2014).1 These developments have 
sparked a significant debate on the effects of disclosures in the financial sector (e.g., Goldstein 
and Sapra, 2014; Acharya and Ryan, 2016; Dang et al., 2019). Our study attempts to contribute 
to this debate by answering the following high-level questions: How does greater public 
information about the fundamentals of the underlying assets affect the liquidity of information-
insensitive securities in debt funding markets? Given that mandatory disclosures increase public 
information, can disclosure regulation be used as a tool to facilitate trading in these markets?  
                                                 
1 These regulations include all-encompassing rules like the Dodd‒Frank Act and the Pillar 3 of the Basel Accord. 
More specifically, the following regulations aim to enhance public information in securitization markets: 
Reg. AB II: https://www.sec.gov/oit/announcement/regabii-asset-level-requirements-compliance.html. 
ECB LLD Initiative: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/coll/loanlevel/html/index.en.html. 
E.U. Reg.: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017R2402&from=en. 
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Prior analytical work articulates how enhanced public information improves liquidity by 
reducing information asymmetry among investors for equity securities (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983; 
Diamond, 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Supporting this view, the empirical literature 
documents a positive association between public information and liquidity in stock markets (e.g., 
Balakrishnan et al., 2014).  
However, it is unclear whether what we know based on equity markets can be carried over 
to debt funding markets. We make this argument because, in contrast to equity markets, in which 
active price discovery is essential, debt funding markets obviate the need for active information 
collection by relying on over-collateralization. In other words, as collateralized debt is in-the-
money in most cases, investors do not generate private information to assess the specific value of 
the collateral, to estimate default risk, and to discover prices. Due to this feature, debt funding 
markets operate smoothly without extensive public information about the fundamentals 
(Holmstrom, 2015). However, disclosing detailed and complex information about the collateral 
could hurt the trading of these securities. This thesis is in the spirit of the recent theoretical work, 
in particular, Dang et al. (2015), who argue that public disclosure of (complex) information about 
the underlying collateral reduces the liquidity of information-insensitive securities. This is because 
complex public information incentivizes sophisticated investors, who can process such information 
with relatively low costs, to generate private information about the likelihood of default of debt 
in order to make profitable trades. In turn, unsophisticated investors, for whom such private 
information production remains too costly, face a typical adverse selection problem and decide to 
pull out of the market, which leads to a dry up in liquidity.2, 3 
                                                 
2  Even if greater public information does not actually trigger sophisticated investors to generate private 
information, it could still alter the beliefs of unsophisticated investors. The fear of adverse selection itself could 
induce unsophisticated traders to pull out of the market.  
3 Kim and Verrecchia (1994) make a similar argument in the context of equity markets. However, their theory 
does not directly apply to our study because as it deals with information-sensitive securities. Furthermore, the 
evidence we report for equity tranches in our paper is inconsistent with the Kim and Verrecchia (1994) narrative. 
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To empirically investigate our research question, we explore the debt tranches of residential 
mortgage-backed securities (MBSs).4 Our focus is on the European MBSs, which are economically 
important and provide a suitable setting to study our research question—we need securities that 
are information-insensitive and used in funding markets.5 Importantly, the European MBSs have 
gone through a significant disclosure regulation, which we utilize to explore our research question. 
In particular, we focus on the European Central Bank’s (ECB) Loan-level Disclosure (LLD) 
Initiative of 2013, which mandated that banks provide periodic and detailed disclosures on 
individual loans underlying the MBSs that the banks pledge as collateral to the ECB in their repo 
borrowings. The ECB LLD Initiative has substantially expanded investors’ information set about 
the fundamentals of the loans underlying MBSs. Entailing more than a hundred data fields for 
tens of millions of loans, these periodic disclosures are complex to process. It is possible that they 
allow certain players in the market to gain advantages over others.6  
From an identification standpoint, the disclosure requirements are enacted in the form of 
an ECB regulation, and they are independent of individual banks’ decisions to seek ECB funding 
as banks were in the ECB repo-financing program prior to the disclosure initiative.7 Moreover, 
                                                 
4 We focus on MBSs because MBSs are by far the largest asset class among all types of ABSs (in our data, MBSs 
constitute over 95% of ABSs with secondary-market liquidity information). 
5 One feature that makes MBSs suitable for our study is the trading structure. Specifically, trading in these 
markets takes place over the counter, where traders call each other to buy and sell securities. To execute these 
bilateral transactions, investors make strategic trading decisions that directly affect liquidity. Further, this over-
the-counter, highly opaque, and bilateral trading structure precludes unsophisticated investors from observing 
and mimicking the trades of sophisticated investors  
Another interesting advantage that the European MBS market offers is the nature of risk. Specifically, since the 
underlying assets of MBSs in Europe are largely adjustable-rate mortgages, the key risk for these products is 
default risk as against prepayment risk—the latter being more relevant for U.S. MBSs. We note that investors’ 
use of disclosures to ascertain default risk, rather than prepayment risk, more closely captures existing theories, 
which critically depend on the notion of default risk (e.g., Dang et al., 2015). 
6 For instance, most banks and insurance companies employ ABSs mainly for short-term funding and for safe 
investments. Consequently, these entities do not prioritize or invest in processing detailed information on the 
underlying assets. Professional money managers, such as hedge funds, however, are incentivized to actively process 
the detailed information to produce private information that allows them to make profitable trades. Consistently, 
our conversations with the data provider suggest that the data is used only by some institutional investors. 
7 The regulation applies to all Eurozone banks; however, banks are affected only if they borrow from the 
Eurosystem and pledge their ABSs as collateral. While banks’ decisions to obtain central-bank financing and to 
pledge ABSs as collateral are not made in a vacuum, the disclosure requirements apply to banks that were already 
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the rules apply to individual securities, rather than banks, which allows us to perform our tests 
within bank-time and thereby remove the effect of confounding factors at the bank level even if 
they are time-varying (e.g., banks’ lending practices, risk profiles, managerial talent). We should 
also highlight that this initiative focuses purely on disclosure, which provides a cleaner setting 
than alternative, broad and multifaceted regulatory shocks to banks, such as the adoption of Basel 
rules and the Dodd–Frank Act.  
We conduct our analysis on a sample of 40,033 security-months pertaining to 1,713 distinct 
debt tranches from 2011 to 2014.8 We perform a series of difference-in-differences analyses that 
examine changes in the liquidity of MBSs over the four-year window surrounding the 
implementation date of the ECB LLD Initiative (January 2013), i.e., two years before and after 
the passage of the regulation. Measuring liquidity is a challenging task, especially in the MBS 
market, due to limited data and over-the-counter trading structure of these markets. To capture 
the different attributes of liquidity comprehensively, we construct a composite proxy of liquidity 
(Schestag et al. 2016). Specifically, we use the first principal component analysis of the following 
three measures: (i) the implicit bid-ask spread based on Fong et al. (2017), (ii) the negative auto-
covariance of prices based on Roll (1984), and (iii) the number of trading days without a trade 
divided by the total number of trading days in a month, as used in prior literature (Lesmond et 
al., 1999; Chen et al., 2007; Adrian et al., 2017).9 
We find that the mandatory disclosure reduces liquidity in the secondary MBS markets: 
Treatment MBSs (i.e., the securities whose collateral is disclosed under the regulation) exhibit a 
                                                 
in the ECB repo financing program. Further, we find no evidence suggesting that banks drop out of the repo 
scheme or cherry-pick ABSs to pledge to avoid the disclosure requirements. In other words, in a difference-in-
differences sense, endogenous selection at the time of the disclosure regulation is muted. See Section 2.  
8 In an ABS deal, the cash flows from the underlying collateral (e.g., mortgage loans in an MBS) are used to pay 
the tranches. Tranches have distinct ISINs, and they are the securities traded. Accordingly, the unit of observation 
in our tests is an ISIN-month, and we use tranche, ISIN, and security interchangeably. 
9 We note that the individual metrics comprising our composite measure has advantages and shortcomings and 
that our PCA-based proxy is likely to provide comprehensive evidence. However, for completeness and robustness, 
we examine the individual components and find similar results. 
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decrease in liquidity by 0.321, relative to control MBSs, over the two years after the ECB LLD 
Initiative. For context, our main measure of liquidity has a sample standard deviation of 1.397, 
which suggests a marginal effect of about 23%. Further, our estimation results are consistent 
across models that include various controls and fixed effects, including two-dimensional lender-
time and tranche-class-time fixed effects. 10  We observe similar pre-regulation trends in the 
liquidity of disclosed and non-disclosed securities, which adds credibility to our difference-in-
differences approach.11  
To shed light on the mechanisms at work and to elaborate on our baseline findings, we 
explore two key economic constructs. First, we examine valuation difficulty. Our main effect 
should be stronger for MBSs that are harder to value because, for such securities, loan-by-loan 
disclosures would be processed more differently amongst existing investors and, hence, result in 
greater adverse selection problems. Our empirical proxy for this notion is return volatility, in that 
securities with above-median return volatility are coded as harder-to-value (Shalen, 1993). In 
keeping with our prediction, we find that the liquidity-reducing effect of the mandatory disclosure 
doubles for securities that are harder to value. 
Second, we investigate the disparity in investors’ information-processing costs. This 
dimension allows us to ascertain the role of the adverse selection perceived by MBS investors in 
the illiquidity effect of disclosures. After all, public information should not hurt liquidity if all 
                                                 
10 Lender-time fixed effects allows us to hold constant the originator’s attributes even if they are time-varying. 
Tranche-class-time fixed effects control for potential differences in liquidity by tranche classes (e.g., senior 
tranches are typically traded less often than junior tranches). 
11 In an additional robustness test, we examine ultra-safe, super-senior tranches (tranche class “A1” only). These 
securities almost never experience losses and thus are hardly susceptible to adverse selection concerns. In keeping 
with deep-in-the-money securities remaining information-insensitive even after the disclosure regulation, we 
observe no changes in the liquidity of these securities. We note that, in addition to validating our arguments 
regarding information sensitivity, the zero-effect finding for ultra-safe tranches also adds credibility to our claim 
that liquidity decreases because of enhanced public information—not due to another aspect of the disclosure 
regulation. If different classes of tranches were affected by the disclosure regulation in ways other than an increase 
in public information (for example, if the LLD Initiative mechanically triggered a disproportionate increase in 
the pledging of disclosed securities), we would find even stronger illiquidity effects for ultra-safe tranches, as these 
tend be pledged much more often (they require a smaller collateral haircuts). As noted, however, our inferences 
suggest otherwise. We discuss this issue further in Section 2. 
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investors perceive a level playing field for information gathering and processing. That is, when the 
holders of an MBS have similar levels of sophistication in processing the information, disclosures 
would not induce investors to leave the market because all of them are equally adept at processing 
information. Consistent with this prediction, we find that loan-level disclosures do not impair the 
liquidity of MBSs whose investors have similar skills and expertise in processing the disclosed 
information. Conversely, our main conclusion that public information reduces liquidity holds for 
cases with high heterogeneity in investor sophistication. 
Our analyses focus on debt tranches, for which we report evidence consistent with the idea 
that an increase in public information reduces liquidity because it distorts the information-
insensitivity of these securities by triggering private information production by a subset of 
investors. However, as noted above, in equity market settings, the literature consistently finds 
that greater public information enhances liquidity. Accordingly, in the last part of our study, we 
take advantage of a unique aspect of MBSs—tranche seniority—to explore this puzzling disparity. 
We re-estimate our tests for equity tranches and, strikingly, find that the same disclosure 
regulation increases the liquidity of these securities. This inference is in line with the notion that 
equity tranches—which are already information sensitive and whose investors seek price 
discovery—experience a reduction in adverse selection post-disclosure-regulation. Aside from 
reconciling ostensibly contradictory conclusions, this finding also underscores the importance of 
the existing nature of the assets/markets in question (e.g., information-sensitivity, investor 
disparity, and valuation complexity) as a crucial factor contributing to the effect of mandatory 
disclosures and public information on liquidity. 
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. Broadly speaking, our findings 
speak to the line of work that studies the link between disclosures and liquidity in capital markets. 
Prior work documents that voluntary disclosure increases short-term liquidity (e.g., Balakrishnan 
et al., 2014) and that liquidity dries up in the short window around/before the disclosure of 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3447412
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backward-looking aggregate information, such as earnings announcements (e.g., Lee et al., 1993).12 
First, unlike the extant literature, our study focuses on debt securities where liquidity is more 
important than price discovery, and we also show completely different findings for equity 
instruments under the same disclosure regulation. Second, our evidence on sustained liquidity 
effects suggests that public disclosures can have consequences for the use of ABSs as a funding 
instrument. Public disclosures can cause investors to pull out of the market and transform the 
nature of an asset class. Lastly, in contrast to the prior work that focuses on disclosures that most 
investors can interpret with relatively low costs, such as earnings announcements, we examine 
complex disclosures that involve high processing costs. Our findings from this setting suggest that 
we may be able to classify public information by its processing costs to understand their liquidity 
effects. In this sense, these inferences speak to the economic consequences of disclosure regulation 
(Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). 
From a specific disclosure standpoint, our study contributes to the literature that examines 
the costs and benefits of enhanced public disclosures in the financial sector (Goldstein and Sapra, 
2014; Acharya and Ryan, 2016), more specifically, in the securitization domain. Neilson et al. 
(2019) show that Regulation AB II’s disclosure requirements enhance the informativeness of yield 
spreads, i.e., the predictive ability of ABS spreads for subsequent performance. Schmidt and Zhang 
(2019) explore the effects of Regulation AB II on the auto-loan-backed securities. The authors 
find that trades become more concentrated around periodic disclosures as well as a long-term 
reduction in liquidity and an increase in yields. Overall, we view that Schmidt and Zhang’s (2019) 
evidence from a distinct ABS setting complements our conclusions.  
We also provide novel insights into the role of information-acquisition incentives and 
information sensitivity in the effect of public information on the liquidity of debt instruments. 
                                                 
12 More recently, Amiram et al. (2016) report evidence that analyst forecasts reduce information asymmetry. 
Christensen et al. (2016) examine the impact of disclosure regulations on short-term liquidity in equity markets. 
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Our study thus provides a direct empirical test of the analytical arguments proposed by Dang et 
al. (2015), Holmstrom (2015), and Gorton (2017). Several recent papers also explore various 
aspects of this narrative.13 In contrast to these papers, our study does not infer the effects of 
information but rather explicitly examines and plausibly exogenously identifies them. Moreover, 
we examine liquidity as the outcome variable. These key distinctions allow us to speak to the idea 
that public disclosures can make information-insensitive securities information-sensitive. To this 
point, we also note that the decline in liquidity persists over the two years post regulation. As 
Dang et al. (2019) evaluate in their discussion of our paper, this is a key contribution, as it is 
evidence that a structural change in the nature of an asset class—information-insensitive MBSs 
becoming information-sensitive and losing their ability to serve as a funding tool. 
Finally, our findings should be of interest to regulators. To enhance transparency and 
thereby promote market discipline, regulators have enacted loan-level disclosure regulations for 
the ABS markets, including Regulation AB II under the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. and the 
Securitisation Regulation in the EU (i.e., Regulation 2017/2402). However, the influence of these 
far-reaching reforms on ABS market liquidity is not well explored or understood. Understanding 
the nature of liquidity provision and the effects of information on this is central to regulating the 
financial system. We believe that the insights we offer can facilitate regulators’ decisions about 
asset-level disclosure regulations. In particular, we also caution that policies derived from stock 
markets may not produce the desired effects in funding markets (Dang et al., 2019). 
 
                                                 
13 Gallagher et al. (2019) look at money market funds that invest in European bonds during the European debt 
crisis of 2011–2012. The authors find that sophisticated investors withdraw funding from information-sensitive 
issuers. Baghai et al. (2018) report evidence that the money market fund reform in the U.S. destroyed the money-
ness of these securities. Brancati and Macchiavelli (2019) provide estimates on the amplification effect of 
information precision on banks’ default risk. Benmelech and Bergman (2018) draw inferences about the 
information sensitivity of debt by showing a positive link between bond liquidity and price. Perignon et al. (2018) 
report similar conclusions from the rating downgrades in the European wholesale certificate of deposit market. 
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2. Institutional Background and Empirical Predictions 
2.1. Overview of Securitization 
Securitization allows lenders to obtain additional funding by packaging their illiquid loans 
and selling them as liquid notes to a broad set of investors. Moreover, lenders can use ABSs—
especially MBSs—as collateral for short-term funding vehicles, such as repo and asset-backed 
commercial papers. Securitization also provides benefits to investors and borrowers. Investors of 
different risk appetites (mainly among institutions) can invest in a variety of securities. This is 
because securitization allows the production of both safer and riskier securities (in the form of 
senior and junior notes) for a pool of loans with similar risk—often medium creditworthiness. 
(Figure 1 depicts a typical securitization structure.) Borrowers can get credit at better rates since 
investors’ demand for securitization products reduces the interest rates of the underlying loans. 
These benefits made securitization a key player in the middle 2000s.14 
However, when housing prices fell, money market investors worried about the quality of 
ABSs and started a run on the shadow banking system (Gorton, 2010, 2012, 2017; Geithner and 
Metrick, 2018). These grave experiences during the recent financial crisis made it clear that 
securitization is not well understood or effectively regulated. Because of the significant and 
unexpected damages inflicted by securitization products, regulators and policymakers identified 
securitization—and its inherent opacity—as one of the main causes of the crisis. According to this 
view, the lack of transparency reduced originating banks’ incentives to screen and monitor 
borrowers, which deteriorated loan quality. In addition, it has been argued that rating agencies 
provided inadequate risk assessments and securitization products were priced without accounting 
for key risk factors, such as correlated defaults.15 As a response to these developments, a critical 
                                                 
14 An extensive literature studies the benefits of securitization. Securitization practices unlock a substantial 
amount of funds for banks and make banks less vulnerable to cost-of-funding shocks (Loutskina, 2011). More 
generally, securitization can prevent the inefficient continuation of projects (Ayotte and Gaon, 2010).  
15 Prior literature reports evidence of banks’ lower screening and monitoring efforts (e.g., Keys et al., 2010; Keys 
et al., 2012; Kara et al., 2015), although these problems do not necessarily apply to all types of securitization 
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item in the post-crisis agenda to reform securitization is to enhance transparency (Jackson 2010; 
Gilson and Kraakman 2014). In particular, asset-level disclosures have been a common theme in 
the post-crisis regulations around the globe.16 
2.2. European MBS Market and the ECB’s Loan-Level Disclosure Initiative 
Institutionally, MBS markets are fundamentally different from equity markets. There is no 
organized exchange, no centralized reporting of transaction volumes, and no market makers. 
Rather, trading takes place over the counter, and transactions are often arranged and executed 
on the phone. Price discrimination is prevalent. While these features restrict data availability 
(compared to stock market trades), they make this very setting quite suitable to test whether 
mandatory disclosures could exacerbate information asymmetry among investors and thus reduce 
liquidity. This is because these markets had been inherently opaque and there have been limited 
alternative sources of information (including centrally advertised asset prices) that investors can 
rely on. Further, this over-the-counter, bilateral, and opaque trading structure precludes 
unsophisticated investors from observing and mimicking the trades of sophisticated investors.  
In our paper, we focus on the European MBS market. There are two main reasons for this 
choice. First, European MBSs have institutional features that are potentially more suitable to test 
the proposition of whether enhanced public information triggers an increase in private information 
by a subset of investors. The loans underlying European MBSs are typically adjustable-rate 
                                                 
(e.g., Benmelech et al., 2012). The problems in ratings and pricing are discussed in the U.S. Congress 
(https://democrats-oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/20081022102221.pdf). 
See also “Shareholder Report on UBS’s Write-Downs” (http://maths-fi.com/ubs-shareholder-report.pdf) for an 
insightful first-hand discussion of the practical issues. 
16 In November 2016, the U.S. adopted Regulation AB II, which requires the disclosure of underlying collateral 
mainly for real estate loan-backed and auto loan-backed securities. In Europe, such asset-level disclosures have 
been implemented in two phases. The ECB LLD Initiative, which took effect in 2013, applies to ABSs that banks 
pledge as collateral in ECB repo financing. The EU’s Securitisation Regulation 2017/2402—which is yet to be 
implemented—extends this requirement to all European securitizations. Overall, these disclosure regulations aim 
to promote transparency, stability, and confidence in the ABS market by providing timely and sufficient 
information so that investors can monitor the quality of underlying assets better and reduce over-reliance on 
credit ratings. 
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(Albertazzi et al., 2018; Badarinza et al., 2018). This detail implies that investors are mainly 
concerned about default risk. By comparison, in the U.S. market, the predominant use of fixed-
rate mortgages makes prepayment risk (i.e., the risk that an abrupt change in interest rates 
affecting borrowers’ refinancing behavior) as a primary consideration. 17  This institutional 
distinction is desirable because the analytical framework that we rely on characterizes investors’ 
attempts to estimate default risk (not another parameter like prepayment risk) as private 
information production (see, e.g., Dang et al., 2015). 
Second, and potentially more importantly, the European MBS setting gives us the cleanest 
empirical framework to answer an important economic question. More specifically, to capture a 
plausibly exogenous increase in public information in the MBS market, we study the ECB LLD 
Initiative of 2013. This regulation mandated that banks provide periodic and detailed disclosures 
on individual loans underlying the MBSs (and other ABSs) that the banks pledge as collateral to 
the ECB in their repo borrowings. We first note that the disclosure requirements constitute a 
significant increase in public information. The quarterly loan-by-loan reports share a similar 
format, which includes more than 100 fields comprising mandatory and voluntary inputs about 
loan terms and performance, borrower characteristics, and the bank’s assessments of the 
borrower’s creditworthiness, among other attributes. Prior to the loan-level disclosure regulation, 
existing investors received sporadic and non-standardized trustee reports based on aggregate 
figures. Thus, the new loan-level reports not only inform a much larger group of market 
participants (including potential investors, information intermediaries, competitors, and 
regulators) but also provide comparable data across securitization entities. Moreover, the loan-
                                                 
17 In this instance, investors that expected to have an MBS paying a stream of relatively high coupons going 
forward are now receiving prepayments that they can only reinvest at lower rates (Hanson 2014). As a result, 
the most valuable loan level information in the U.S. is information could be related to prepayment risk, as certain 
households are more prone to prepayment than others (based on income, age, primary/secondary residence, 
location, etc.). While this detail is not irrelevant in Europe, we believe it is not a first-order consideration. Besides, 
even if it were, this argument would not invalidate our main narrative that an exogenous rise in public information 
could trigger private information acquisition, and thus exacerbate adverse selection and hamper liquidity. 
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level reports reveal a substantial amount of detailed information that investors can use to better 
ascertain the underlying risks and exposures. Much of these inferences, including assessments of 
risk-barbelling and risk-layering, would not be discernible in aggregate reports (Ryan 2018).  
Moreover, we verify that investors actually use the loan-level data in their decisions. Our 
discussions with the European DataWarehouse (ED), the regulatory body that collects and 
administers loan-level disclosures, indicate that about 160 institutional investor subscribers 
download and process the loan-level data files. Prior literature has also reported evidence on the 
efficacy of the LLD Initiative, which suggests that an economically meaningful set of investors use 
this information.18 
We note two potential concerns regarding our setting. First, if this regulation had been 
implemented in tandem with other reforms, the LLD Initiative may not be the correct treatment. 
Indeed, several reforms took place in Europe during 2011–2014 (e.g., the ECB’s unconventional 
monetary policy interventions, developments relating to Basel III and Solvency II, and national 
banking regulations). However, it is critical to highlight that the LLD Initiative affected a subset 
of European banks (i.e., those banks that borrow from the Eurosystem with their ABSs pledged 
as collateral). Thus, to the extent that economic policies and regulatory developments do not 
affect those banks systematically differently, our setting is not susceptible to these confounding 
effects. We should also note that our empirical design addresses this concern by adopting a within-
bank-time specification, which effectively compares the post-LLD liquidity change of a “disclosed” 
MBS to that of a “non-disclosed” MBS of the same bank in a given period. 
                                                 
18 For instance, Ertan et al. (2017) find that loan-level disclosures increase the quality of loans. The main channel 
the authors point out is enhanced transparency improved bank managers’ monitoring of borrowers as a result of 
increased market discipline. Balakrishnan and Ertan (2019), on the other hand, focus on the quantity of loans 
and find that loan-level disclosures increase bank lending to small businesses, conditional on borrowers’ demand 
for credit. The mechanism at work is that enhanced transparency allays banks’ financing frictions and reduces 
the cost of capital, which allows them to raise more funds and ultimately supply more credit to the real sector. 
This line of work focuses on improvements at the bank level. Our paper focuses on the effects of loan-level 
disclosures on the market liquidity of MBSs, which might be more directly affected by the disclosure regulation. 
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The second potential concern is that even if the LLD regulation does constitute the correct 
treatment effect, it may have affected factors other than the level of public information about 
MBSs. In particular, the banks’ repo borrowing or—conditional on borrowing—pledging decisions 
could change simultaneously with loan-level disclosures under the regulation. These parameters 
should relatively stable around the implementation of the disclosure regulation so that we can 
attribute the main treatment effect to disclosures, rather than changing borrowing/pledging 
choices. In terms of repo borrowing, we note that when the LLD Initiative started in January 
2013, affected banks had already been in the repo program. That is, the banks’ loan-level 
disclosures and repo funding did not start in the same period.19 With regard to banks’ potential 
cherry-picking of MBSs to pledge, none of our discussions with practitioners suggests that this 
behavior is commonplace.20 Importantly, our empirical tests support this view: We find that while 
the LLD Initiative reduces the liquidity of safe tranches, it has no effect on the liquidity of ultra-
safe tranches. If banks’ systematically changing their borrowing and/or pledging behavior 
explained above is commonplace, we should observe a much more significant decline in the 
liquidity of ultra-safe tranches because banks would prioritize pledging the ultra-safe tranches (for 
which the required haircut is smallest).  
                                                 
19 We further examine the average likelihood of an MBS to be pledged as collateral to the ECB around the 
regulation. We do not observe a significant change around January 2013 (the treatment date) in the ratio of 
pledged ABS assets to pledgable ABS assets as 41% in 2012 and 43% in 2013. This ratio would dive if the ECB 
LLD Initiative triggered banks to pledge fewer assets systematically to avoid the costs of disclosures.  
See the ECB website for more statistics: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/coll/charts/html/index.en.html. 
Moreover, we also note the possibility that banks might have dropped out of the repo program around January 
2013 to avoid the cost of disclosures, but our discussions with practitioners indicate that this behavior is not 
commonplace. 
20 The following example describes a scenario under which the change in banks’ pledging behavior could drive our 
inferences. Suppose that a bank was pledging to the ECB two distinct securities, MBS X and MBS Y, with each 
of the pledges at €50. Following the LLD Initiative, the bank decides to keep its total repo position with the 
ECB at €100, but in order to minimize the cost of disclosures, it chooses to pledge MBS X only. (This reshuffling 
makes the pledged value of MBS X €100 and that of MBS Y €0, allowing the bank to provide loan-level 
information for MBS X only.) As discussed, however, our anecdotes and empirical evidence are inconsistent with 
a systematic occurrence of this behavior. 
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Overall, we believe that the ECB LLD regulation is a suitable setting to study our research 
questions. The loan-level data paradigm marks an economically significant and plausibly 
exogenous increase in public information available to MBS investors. In what follows, we 
hypothesize and test whether this increase in public information triggers private information 
production by MBS investors, and thus, reduces trading liquidity. 
2.3. Empirical Predictions 
Trading in financial markets requires liquidity, or the ability to trade securities quickly 
without the transaction affecting prices and without an uninformed investor losing money to a 
privately informed party. Given the central role of liquidity in the functioning of financial markets, 
the relation between disclosures and liquidity has been a long-standing question in the literature. 
Most studies focus on equity markets and find a positive link between these two constructs. 
Analytical research, such as Verrecchia (1983), Diamond (1985), and Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1991), explains why and how disclosures of public information facilitate trade by reducing 
information asymmetry among investors. The essence of this narrative is that disclosures promote 
symmetric information. Supporting this view, the extant empirical literature generally documents 
a positive association between various types of disclosures and market liquidity (e.g., Balakrishnan 
et al., 2014; Welker 1995). Moreover, following this argument, many researchers use liquidity as 
an outcome variable to understand the economic consequences of several disclosure regulations 
(e.g., Bushee and Leuz, 2005; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Bischof and Daske, 2013). 
More recently, however, a strand of analytical research contends that the effects of 
disclosures on liquidity might differ in debt markets. This disparity arises from the structural 
differences in the goals and functioning of equity and debt markets. As Holmstrom (2015) argues, 
equity markets primarily aim to share and allocate aggregate risk. To achieve this goal, equity 
markets pursue active price discovery, in which information is reflected in prices quickly. In equity 
markets, investors actively gather information to value stocks and realize the highest risk-adjusted 
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return possible.  
On the other hand, debt funding markets aim to provide liquidity. The cheapest way to do 
so is to use over-collateralized debt that obviates the need for active information collection to 
discover prices. A debt contract simply states that if the borrower pays the face value of the debt 
at maturity, there are no further obligations and the collateral is returned. This collateralization 
structure enables investors to avoid a precise assessment of collateral value and a costly price 
discovery until maturity. That is, collateralized debt, including MBSs, is generally information-
insensitive as it is expected to be paid in full in most cases. (Only a high possibility of default will 
trigger a precise assessment, making debt information-sensitive.) 21  Due to their information 
insensitivity, debt funding markets operate smoothly without extensive public information about 
the fundamentals of debt. However, a public release of detailed and complex fundamental 
information could distort the information insensitivity of debt and hamper investors’ willingness 
to trade by exacerbating adverse selection problems (Dang et al., 2015).  
These insights imply that periodic disclosures of loan-level information could reduce the 
liquidity of the debt tranches of MBSs. Sophisticated investors would be able to understand the 
pricing implication of the information with lower costs than unsophisticated investors, as it is 
hard to incorporate such detailed data intro the valuation of MBSs. Accordingly, sophisticated 
investors would be more incentivized to process the information to make profitable trades against 
unsophisticated investors. Unsophisticated investors—for whom the option to process the complex 
information remains prohibitively costly—would be reluctant to trade with sophisticated investors 
due to fears of adverse selection caused by the heightened information asymmetry as in Akerlof 
                                                 
21 Building on this idea, theoretical insights from Dang et al. (2010, 2015), Dang et al. (2017), Pagano and Volpin 
(2012), Gorton (2010, 2014), and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) suggest that debt is the optimal security for 
funding because it allays the incentive to produce private information about the payoff (Gorton, 2018). 
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(1970).22 Accordingly, unsophisticated investors might prevent adverse selection by reducing the 
trading amount below the expected value of the debt or give in to adverse selection by not trading 
at all. As a result, market liquidity would decline. The pertinent hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1. Mandatory loan-level disclosures reduce the liquidity of the debt tranches of MBSs. 
Given the integral role information acquisition costs play in our narrative, we extend our 
investigation to ascertain the role of the level of difficulty in valuing MBSs. We expect that 
unsophisticated investors worry more about adverse selection for harder-to-value deals because 
information-processing costs for such deals are higher, and, therefore, sophisticated investors 
would find private information production particularly profitable. Accordingly, the liquidity will 
drop more significantly when MBSs are more difficult to value. Formally, we pose the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. The liquidity-reducing effect of the mandatory loan-level disclosures is more 
pronounced when the valuation of MBSs is harder. 
 The level of disparity in investors’ incentives to process public information is essential to 
our narrative. If the net benefits of processing complex loan-level information are uniformly 
positive (or negative) for all investors, then public information would not result in a dissimilar 
level of private information production and thus would not impair liquidity. Contrastingly, when 
only a subset of investors is incentivized to process the complex information, information 
asymmetry would rise, and liquidity would drop. We posit that the incentive to engage in costly 
information production would be higher for sophisticated investors (i.e., the more dominant 
                                                 
22 The MBS market is complex, and individual investors rarely participate in them. Nevertheless, there is a 
significant variation in the sophistication, skill, and resources of the institutional investors who trade in these 
markets (Dang et al., 2015).  
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players in the MBS market who enjoy a more complete infrastructure, such as investment analytics 
and a team of professionals) than for their unsophisticated counterparts. Accordingly, we examine 
the variation in investor sophistication to provide insights into the channel through which 
enhanced public disclosures influence liquidity. Specifically, we expect that the liquidity-reducing 
impact of disclosures will be greater especially when the investors of a given MBS are particularly 
different from one another in terms of sophistication. We propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3. The liquidity-reducing effect of the mandatory loan-level disclosures is more 
pronounced when the disparity in investor sophistication is higher. 
3. Data and Research Design 
3.1. Data 
We obtain our data comes from EuroABS, European DataWarehouse, and Bloomberg. 
Information on the population of European ABSs comes from the EuroABS website. Established 
in 1999 by ex-market professionals, the EuroABS collects and contains deal and tranche-level 
data, including issuance date and amount, participants, ratings, and coupon or spread, for all 
European ABSs that have been issued since 1995. As of December 2017, the EuroABS website 
stored 7,120 deals comprising 23,448 tranches (ISINs). 
Next, we identify ABSs subject to the ECB LLD Initiative using data we obtain from the 
European DataWarehouse (ED), the data repository that contains loan-level data and provides 
information on the securities it includes. Since the launch of the LLD regulation in January 2013, 
loan-level data has been provided in a standardized template and at least on a quarterly basis. 
The ED administers the processing, verification, and handling of the data. As of 2018, the ED 
stored about 64 million loans underlying 1,223 active and redeemed deals. Residential MBSs are 
by far the largest asset class in terms of the number of deals, constituting about 55% of the ABS 
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population.23 
Lastly, we collect data on the characteristics and transactions of ABSs from Bloomberg. For 
ABSs contained in the EuroABS and the ED, we collect daily trading prices and bid and ask 
quotes. For the asset (collateral) side of ABS deals, we gather monthly (amortizing) collateral 
balances, the number of underlying loans, and collateral quality information such as 
nonperforming loan portion. For the liability (tranche) side, we collect monthly (amortizing) 
principal balances, yields, and maturities. We also gather bond quality data, such as credit ratings 
and loan-to-value ratio, and a variety of other essential information, including investor identities. 
Our final sample consists of 40,033 security-months pertaining to 1,713 distinct tranches 
coming from 10 European countries over the period of 2011–2014. We limit our sample to 
(residential) MBSs, which constitute over 95% of ABSs with secondary-market data from 
Bloomberg. The UK, Spain, Ireland, and the Netherlands account for the majority of our sample, 
consistent with active mortgage securitization and marketable MBSs in these countries. 
3.2. Research Design and Measurement  
To establish a baseline for our analysis, we compare the illiquidity of MBSs that provide 
loan-level data as of January 2013 under the ECB LLD Initiative (“Disclosed MBSs”) with that 
of MBSs not subject to the initiative and thus never provide loan-level information. Our security-
month-level sample spans the period from 2011–2014, i.e., two years before and two years after 
the implementation date of the regulation (January 2013).24 To do so, we estimate the following 
difference-in-differences model: 
                                                 
23 Source: European DataWarehouse. For a more detailed explanation of the regulation and the data, see 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/coll/loanlevel/html/index.en.html. To perform our empirical analyses, we 
identify and download individual submissions using the interface provided by the ED. The entire population of 
loan-level data can be collated via complex query-based analyses of more than 21,000 submissions.  
24 The ECB LLD Initiative was adopted in 2013 but provided banks with a nine-month phase-in period. For this 
reason and other fundamental factors (e.g., sophisticated investors building the infrastructure for collecting and 
processing information), we adopt a two-year window, rather than a shorter window.  
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Liquiditys, t =  β0 + β1 Disclosed MBSs × Postt + β2 Disclosed MBSs 
 + Γ Xs, t + ߥc + πp + r, t + μl, t + εs, t.        (1) 
In this model, s denotes a security (i.e., a tranche or ISIN), t denotes a calendar year-month, 
c denotes a country (i.e., registered country of the security), p denotes a special-purpose entity 
(i.e., a paper company that issues the security), r denotes a tranche class (i.e., class of the security 
by its seniority), and l denotes a lender (i.e., originating bank). We work at the tranche level since 
security liquidity is defined at the tranche (i.e., ISIN) level and because allowing multiple tranches 
for a given MBS enables us to make seniority comparisons to explore the different information 
sensitivity by tranche classes. We perform monthly analyses because we observe liquidity at a 
monthly level. 25  Disclosed MBS is a time-invariant indicator variable that switches on for 
securities whose underlying collateral is disclosed on an asset-by-asset basis under the ECB LLD 
Initiative. Post is also an indicator variable that equals one for months on or after January 2013, 
and zero otherwise.  
Liquidity is a composite measure that relies on a variety of empirical proxied used in credit 
markets literature (e.g., Adrian et al., 2017; Schestag et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2007; Lesmond et 
al., 1999). Specifically, Liquidity is the first principal component of the following three illiquidity 
metrics, multiplied by minus one. The first metric is based on Fong et al. (2017) and computed 
as 2σN -1(1+( z 2)⁄ ), where σ is the standard deviation of bond returns, N-1 is the inverse function 
of the cumulative normal distribution of the bond return, and z is the portion of zero-returns days. 
The second metric is based on Roll (1984) and calculated as 2ඥ(-Cov (R௧, Rt-1) if Cov < 0 or 0 
otherwise, where Rt is the bond return. The third metric is the number of nontrading days divided 
by the total number of trading days in a month. (The higher values of these three metrics signify 
                                                 
25 According to Bloomberg coverage, the European MBS markets do not have a significant level of intra-day 
trades, and annual-level data would be too coarse to allow us to infer the effects of enhanced public information.  
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greater illiquidity.) This composite proxy captures the notion of liquidity holistically, but in 
robustness tests, we examine its components individually.26 
Xs, t consists of the following control variables to account for security characteristics that 
could affect its liquidity and may be correlated with the likelihood of being a disclosed MBS: 
Collateral Amount, Collateral Balance Factor, Tranche Amount, Tranche Balance Factor, 
Number of Loans, Nonperforming Collateral, Yield, Rating, Loan-to-value, Age, Remaining Life, 
and Return Volatility. The amounts and the balance factors include information about the 
monthly collateral and tranche balances in the special-purpose entity. Number of Loans is the 
natural logarithm of the number of loans outstanding underlying the security at each month-end. 
Nonperforming Collateral is the portion of the nonperforming loan balance to the total balance of 
the underlying loans. Yield is the security’s yield, including the coupon. Rating is a numerical 
translation of credit ratings for the security.27 Loan-to-value is the average loan to collateral value 
ratio, a standard proxy for the extent of over-collateralization. Age is the number of years since 
the security’s issuance, while Remaining life is the security’s time to maturity in years.28 Return 
Volatility is the monthly standard deviation of the security’s daily returns.  
Finally, we employ an extensive fixed effects structure, including country (ߥc), special-
purpose entity (πp), tranche-class-time (r,t), and lender-time (μl,t) fixed effects. The country and 
special-purpose entity (SPE) controls aim to account for the inherent country and ABS attributes 
that could affect liquidity. For instance, Dutch mortgage and ABS markets are different from 
                                                 
26 Note that the over-the-counter nature of the European MBS trading renders unavailable trade volume data, 
which is why we are unable to construct measures of price impact or Amihud’s illiquidity—popular proxies for 
stock market liquidity. However, we also note that researchers examining credit markets commonly use our 
metrics above. In additional tests, on a restricted sample, we explore the bid-ask spread as a dependent variable.  
27 We assign 1 to the best rating and 22 the worst. If rating agencies provide different ratings, we use the average 
numerical value of these ratings. 
28 These two variables are particularly helpful to account for life-related factors that impact trading. For instance, 
the MBS markets could see active trading right after the origination of the MBS, as these securities find their 
way in the portfolios of real money investors, such as insurance companies and pension funds. Outside of this 
small window of time, there could be some trading if a security is downgraded and for regulatory reasons pension 
funds have to sell it. 
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British markets. Similarly, the type of credit the MBS underlies is fixed in time but likely an 
important driver of its average liquidity. Among others, these attributes include amortization 
structure (e.g., interest-only, principal-only, or standard amortization), prepayment risk 
(adjustable-rate vs. fixed-rate credit), and government guarantees.29 Tranche-class-time fixed 
effects dynamically account for concurrent developments and regulations that could affect a whole 
class of MBSs throughout our sample period. Lender-time fixed effects effectively compare, in the 
same month, a security with asset disclosures to another without, both of which are originated by 
the same bank.  
To examine our additional hypotheses, we partition our primary estimation sample by MBS 
valuation difficulty and investor disparity. Our proxy for the former is based on return volatility. 
With the assumption that securities with higher volatility are harder to value (Shalen, 1993), we 
split the sample at the median. To capture investor disparity, we first construct a proxy for 
investor sophistication. Our measure of investor sophistication is the number of deals a given 
investor invests in. The assumption here is that investors with a greater presence in the MBS 
market are relatively more sophisticated. Second, for each MBS, we calculate the standard 
deviation of investor sophistication. This procedure yields our proxy for investor disparity. 
Namely, disparity gets higher when a deal is invested in by some sophisticated and some 
unsophisticated investors. As with MBS complexity, in our cross-sectional tests, we split the 
sample at the median of this variable.  
Table 2 presents the sample statistics of our variables. We observe that Liquidity has a 
mean (median) of -0.248 (0.212). About 39% of our observations are coded as Disclosed MBS, 
while about 66% of them come from after January 2013. The median MBS in our sample has a 
                                                 
29 SPE fixed effects also account for different flavors of MBS structures. The standard plain vanilla tranche is a 
sequential-pay tranche but there may be other tranches like planned amortization class (PAC) tranches, targeted 
amortization class (TAC) tranches, support tranches, Z-tranches, etc. Presumably, some tranches are more 
straightforward to value than others, and we are able to account for these features. 
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nonperforming loan ratio of 4.1%, a loan-to-value ratio of 71.5%, a yield of 1.3%, an age of about 
seven years, and a remaining life of over 30 years. 
4. Empirical Results 
This section presents the results of our empirical analyses. We begin by exploring the 
findings from baseline tests and proceed to test the robustness of these inferences (Hypothesis 1). 
We then report evidence on the drivers of the relationship between mandatory disclosure and 
liquidity (Hypotheses 2 and 3). 
4.1. Main Findings and Robustness Tests 
To shed light on the average effect of mandatory disclosure on the liquidity in the MBS 
market, we first estimate equation (1). Table 3 reports the findings; the main coefficient of interest, 
Disclosed MBS × Post, is highlighted in grey. Interestingly, in the specification with all fixed 
effects but without control variables (column (1)), we find that the liquidity of disclosed MBSs 
increases by 0.544, relative to non-disclosed MBSs, after the implementation of the ECB LLD 
Initiative. For context, the sample standard deviation of Liquidity is 1.397, suggesting a sizeable 
marginal effect. When we add control variables (column (2)), the coefficient estimate on Disclosed 
MBS × Post stabilizes at 0.377. 
In columns (3) and (4), we enhance our estimation model with more restrictive fixed effects. 
We first interact lender and year-month fixed effects and present the results in column (3). These 
two-dimensional lender-times-year-month fixed effects account for the time-invariant and time-
varying characteristics of the originating bank (e.g., banks’ lending practices, risk profiles, 
managerial talent). Therefore, this specification allows us to compare two securities (one disclosed 
and one non-disclosed) of the same bank in the same month. The estimate of the main effect in 
this specification slightly goes down to 3.38%. In column (4), we also interact tranche-class and 
year-month fixed effects to account for potential differences in illiquidity by tranche classes over 
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time (e.g., senior tranches are typically traded less often than junior tranches, and this difference 
could change over time). This most restrictive specification yields the estimate we mention in the 
abstract and introduction: a 0.321 decline in liquidity, as a result of the loan-level disclosures, 
which translates to about 23% of the sample standard deviation of Liquidity (which is 1.397).  
We also note Figure 2 shows that the effect of disclosures kicks in relatively quickly, while 
the pre-treatment trend in liquidity appears statistically identical for disclosed and non-disclosed 
MBSs—which alleviates lingering concerns about potentially confounding differences between 
these two groups of MBSs. Overall, the inferences from these specifications suggest that our 
conclusion holds within lender-month and within tranche-class-month. We use this model in our 
subsequent analyses and suppress the estimates on the control variables for brevity. 
To further verify the association between disclosures and illiquidity, we perform several 
robustness tests. We report these results in Table 4. First, we extend our examination to ultra-
safe tranches (i.e., the most senior tranche of the deal with class A1). These securities that 
(empirically speaking) never experience losses and thus are hardly susceptible to adverse selection 
concerns. For this group, we do not expect to find a significant result because these securities are 
so deep in the money that the adverse effects of disclosures on the money-ness of these tranches 
would be limited. Consistently, as shown in Panel A of Table 4, we find that the liquidity of these 
securities does not change after the disclosure regulation. By contrast, the main effect is driven 
by information-insensitive securities that could become information-sensitive. In addition to 
validating our arguments about information sensitivity, this finding also adds credibility to the 
main treatment. If the disclosure regulation affected the trading of these securities in ways other 
than an increase in public information (e.g., if the LLD Initiative mechanically increased the 
pledging amounts of disclosed securities), we would find even stronger illiquidity effects for ultra-
safe tranches. Our inferences, however, suggest otherwise.  
Second, we study the robustness of our empirical specifications. We start by re-estimating 
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our tests on a narrower sample that spans 24 months instead of 48 months. Consistent with the 
takeaways from Figure 2, we observe that the liquidity-reducing effects of mandatory disclosures 
set in relatively quickly (column (1)). We next perform a treatment intensity test, in which we 
define Disclosed MBS as a continuous variable. This proxy exploits the observation that the 
disclosure regulation requires the publication of mandatory information fields, as well as voluntary 
ones. Accordingly, the continuous variant of Disclosed MBS ranges from zero to one, with one 
denoting securities for which all the fields of the LLD reports are disclosed. By definition, control 
securities have a score of zero. In the sample of treatment securities, Disclosed MBS as a 
continuous variable varies between 0.56 and 1.00. As column (2) of Panel B shows, this quasi-
treatment-intensity estimator provides further support for our conclusion, with a statistically 
significant coefficient estimate of –0.379. Economically, a one standard deviation increase in 
continuous Disclosed MBS (=0.43) reduces Liquidity by about 12 of its standard deviation. In 
column (3) of the same panel, we show results from a specification that relies on a propensity-
score-matched (PSM) sample.30 This test helps us better ensure the similarity between disclosed 
and non-disclosed securities, especially in terms of observables. We observe that our inferences 
continue to hold. 
Finally, we estimate our primary regression model for alternative measures of liquidity. This 
analysis aims to ascertain the extent to which our conclusions are driven by a specific component 
of our composite liquidity measure. As discussed in the preceding section, we use three common 
proxies for liquidity (or lack thereof). As Panel C of Table 4 shows, our conclusions hold for each 
of the three individual illiquidity proxies—the illiquidity measure of Fong et al. (2017), the 
illiquidity measure of Roll (1984), and the portion of nontrading days. We complement this finding 
by examining bid-ask spreads, which are available for a markedly smaller sample. The results 
                                                 
30 Note that the PSM sample has significantly fewer observations. This is because our matching procedure ensures 
that the treatment and control samples are statistically indistinguishable at the time of the regulation (January 
2013). The first stage of our matching process includes the entirety of the controls we employ in our tests.  
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presented in Panel D of Table 4 suggest that our main takeaway holds for alternative specifications 
in which the dependent variable is bid-ask spread (column (1)) and the first principal component 
of bid-ask spreads and the three measures mentioned above (column (2)). Collectively, the 
estimates we discuss thus far provide support for Hypothesis 1: mandatory loan-level disclosures 
reduce the liquidity of the debt tranches of MBSs. 
4.2. Mechanisms: Valuation Complexity and Investor Disparity 
We next shift our focus to the cross-section to better understand the mechanism. We first 
explore valuation difficulty. The underlying rationale here is that for harder to value securities, 
holding all else constant, the room for differential interpretation and processing of disclosure will 
be higher. As a result, our main effects should be stronger for harder-to-value instruments. We 
use past return volatility as a proxy, in that we code securities as harder-to-value if they are 
associated with above-median return volatility. We present our empirical findings in Table 5. 
Even though there are economically meaningful effects for securities that are less difficult to value, 
we report statistically and quantitatively more significant effects for comparatively harder-to-
value securities (Hypothesis 2). These estimation results underscore the importance of valuation 
difficulty in the link between mandatory disclosures and liquidity. 
We then explore investor disparity. In our narrative, a critical element that mediates the 
negative relation between disclosures and liquidity is adverse selection driven by the disparity in 
investor sophistication. Thus, we expect that loan-level disclosures hurt liquidity more for MBSs 
that exhibit a relatively large variation in investor sophistication (Hypothesis 3). We posit that 
loan-level disclosures are complex enough that the degree to which sophisticated investors can 
process them is different from that of unsophisticated investors, and that more experienced 
investors have a higher level of sophistication. Accordingly, we measure investor sophistication by 
the extent of an investor’s involvement in the MBS market. Specifically, we use the number of 
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distinct MBS deals each of the MBS investors have invested. (Larger values indicate greater 
sophistication and expertise in the MBS market.) We then take the standard deviation of this 
value for each security to capture the variation in sophistication. Table 6 presents the results. 
When the disparity in investor sophistication is low (i.e., below the sample median), we do not 
find that mandatory public information reduces liquidity (column (1)). In contrast to this finding, 
the difference-in-differences estimator almost doubles for a subsample of securities in which there 
is a high disparity in investor sophistication (column (2)).  
Overall, these inferences provide insights consistent with cautionary arguments in prior work 
(Holmstrom 2015; Dang et al., 2015; Gorton 2018). In the absence of public information, the MBS 
market operates smoothly without severe information asymmetry among investors. A public 
release of detailed information could enhance the incentives of sophisticated investors to value 
MBSs and thereby increase the information asymmetry between sophisticated and unsophisticated 
investors. Fearing adverse selection, unsophisticated investors would reduce or stop trading. As a 
result, the liquidity in the MBS market would fall.  
4.3. Equity versus Debt 
In the final part of our study, we exploit a unique feature of MBSs, in that these instruments 
have multiple tranches that differ in pay-off structure. Specifically, we contrast our findings from 
the debt tranches with that from equity tranches. As discussed above, unlike with debt tranches, 
price discovery is of paramount importance in equity tranches.  
As Table 7 shows, the sign of the main effect flips for these securities (the coefficient estimate 
becomes 0.784). This finding suggests that loan-level disclosures increase liquidity when the 
security is inherently information-sensitive, namely, when investors are seeking information. This 
insight has two important implications. First, it highlights that public disclosure, for the same 
underlying structure, could have different liquidity effects, depending on the asset’s information 
sensitivity. Second, this finding from equity tranches is not directly consistent with the prediction 
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of Kim and Verrecchia (1994) that public information reduces liquidity in equity markets; rather, 
it is in line with the prediction of the traditional equity literature (Diamond and Verrecchia, 
1991). 
In addition to helping us evaluate the variation in the treatment effect by the degree of 
information sensitivity, these tests provide reassuring evidence on our main story. For instance, 
there may be lingering concerns that the availability of more accurate information reduces the 
amount of trading because the end investors can make a clearer assessment of the risks involved 
and thus be more resolute about whether they want to hold on to the security or not. That is, 
price is discovered with fewer trades. Furthermore, there may be concurrent regulations and 
developments affecting certain securities more. These concerns, however, predict a uniform 
relationship—or at least a monotonic relationship—across different degrees of seniority. By 
contrast, our findings lend support to our main argument: Only for information-insensitive assets, 
an increase in public information exacerbates adverse selection by leading to endogenous private 
information production. 
5. Conclusion 
Prior literature generally documents that disclosures improve liquidity by reducing 
information asymmetry among investors. More recently, analytical researchers have challenged 
this view and argued that the effect depends on the structure of the financial market in question, 
as well as the information-acquisition incentives of investors. Specifically, enhanced public 
information can hurt the liquidity of information-insensitive securities if such information results 
in a divergence of information-acquisition incentives amongst investors.  
To shed light on this issue, we examine the secondary-market liquidity effects of mandatory 
loan-level disclosures for the debt tranches of mortgage-backed securities (MBSs). We find that 
the loan-level disclosures reduce the liquidity of the debt tranches of MBSs by 23%. We find that 
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the liquidity decline is stronger among securities that are harder to value, which is consistent with 
the notion that public information for such securities can result in differential information 
advantages for investors. Further, we find that the skill asymmetry among investors is an 
important factor in the liquidity-reducing effect of disclosures. Loan-level disclosures decrease 
liquidity especially when the disparity in investor sophistication is high.  
We acknowledge that our paper is not without limitations. In particular, the welfare 
implication of our findings is not obvious. As Holmstrom (2015) points out, the accumulation of 
liquidity in good times could result in bigger crashes later. If this is the case, the reduction of 
liquidity in ABS markets due to enhanced transparency could be desirable for financial stability. 
We also recognize that the adverse effects of a reduction in the liquidity in ABS markets could be 
offset by improvements in securitization practices (Mersch, 2014, 2017; Ertan et al., 2017; 
Balakrishnan and Ertan, 2019). As a result, even though our evidence is relevant to regulators 
seeking to implement credit-market reforms, the inferences we provide alone do not prescribe an 
optimal regulatory system.  
We also leave future research several important follow-up questions that are beyond the 
scope of our study. First, does the cost of reduced liquidity in secondary markets outweigh the 
benefits from more transparent securitization practices? Second, do the conclusions we draw apply 
in bad times? Third, does disclosure hurt liquidity in other experimental settings, such as 
Regulation AB II in the U.S.? These questions deserve attention from a regulatory perspective as 
well, since securitization markets are in the process of adopting asset-level disclosure rules globally. 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions 
  
Variable Name Definition 
Age Difference between security issuance date and current date in years. 
Collateral Amount Natural logarithm of the original face amount of collateral in Euros. 
Collateral Balance Factor The month-end face balance of collateral divided by the original face amount of collateral. 
Liquidity 
The first principle component of three illiquidity metrics, multiplied by -1 for ease of interpretation.  
The first metric is based on Fong et al. (2017) and computed as 2σN	-1(1+( z 2)⁄ ), where σ is the 
standard deviation of bond returns, N-1 is the inverse function of the cumulative normal distribution of 
the bond return, and z is the portion of zero-returns days.  
The second metric is based on Roll (1984) and calculated as 2ඥ(-Cov (R௧, Rt-1) if Cov < 0 or 0 
otherwise, where Rt is the bond return.  
The third metric is the number of nontrading days divided by the total number of trading days in a 
month; its higher value signifies greater illiquidity. 
Loan-to-value The weighted average loan to value ratio of the collateral group to which the security belongs. 
Nonperforming Collateral The month-end face balance of nonperforming collateral divided by the month-end face balance of total collateral. 
Number of Loans Natural logarithm of the number of loans outstanding underlying the security at month-end. 
Post Indicator variable that switches on for months on or after the implementation date of the ECB’s LLD Initiative (January 2013). 
Rating 
The mean of the initial credit ratings for the security of S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch (converted to 1 to 22 
with 1 denoting the highest rating and 22 the lowest rating). 
Remaining Life Difference between the current date and the maturity date in years. 
Return Volatility Monthly standard deviation of daily returns. (Values are imputed where missing.) 
Tranche Amount Natural logarithm of the original issue amount of tranche in Euros. 
Tranche Balance Factor The month-end principal balance of tranche divided by the original issue amount of tranche.  
Disclosed MBS 
Indicator variable that switches on for securities whose underlying loans are disclosed on an asset-by-
asset basis under the ECB’s LLD Initiative. The data source is the European DataWarehouse. 
Yield Monthly yield including coupon. 
Sorted alphabetically. The data source is Bloomberg unless stated otherwise. Test-specific variables are defined in table captions. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the sample statistics. Each observation is an ISIN-month. For indicator 
variables, only the sample averages are presented, as the other moments are degenerate. All 
variables are defined in Table 1. 
  
  Mean  Std. Dev. p10 p50 p90 N 
       
Liquidity -0.248 1.397 -2.116 0.212 0.933 40,033 
Disclosed MBS × Post 0.283 . . . . 40,033 
Disclosed MBS 0.388 . . . . 40,033 
Post 0.664 . . . . 40,033 
Collateral Amount 21.244 1.636 19.824 20.786 25.159 40,033 
Collateral Balance Factor 0.530 2.289 0.177 0.386 0.789 40,033 
Tranche Amount 18.461 1.795 16.186 18.307 20.832 40,033 
Tranche Balance Factor 0.681 0.328 0.186 0.770 1.000 40,033 
Number of Loans 8.731 1.553 6.925 8.394 11.922 40,033 
Nonperforming Collateral 0.081 0.105 0.004 0.041 0.244 40,033 
Yield 0.019 0.033 0.005 0.013 0.034 40,033 
Rating 3.971 3.531 1.000 2.667 9.000 40,033 
Loan-to-value 0.661 0.177 0.408 0.715 0.826 40,033 
Age 7.045 2.337 4.339 7.181 9.794 40,033 
Remaining Life 31.342 8.655 22.706 30.018 41.477 40,033 
Return Volatility 0.013 0.023 0.000 0.004 0.033 40,033 
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Table 3. Mandatory Disclosures and Liquidity—Main Results 
This table presents the results of the difference-in-differences analyses that examine the impact of 
the ECB LLD Initiative on the secondary-market liquidity of mortgage-backed securities. Each 
observation is an ISIN-month. The dependent variable, Liquidity, is the first principle component 
of three illiquidity metrics, multiplied by -1 for ease of interpretation. The first metric is based on 
Fong et al. (2017) and computed as 2σN	-1(1+( z 2)⁄ ), where σ is the standard deviation of bond 
returns, N-1 is the inverse function of the cumulative normal distribution of the bond return, and 
z is the portion of zero-returns days. The second metric is based on Roll (1984) and calculated as 
2ඥ(-Cov (R௧, Rt-1) if Cov < 0 or 0 otherwise, where Rt is the bond return. The third metric is the 
number of nontrading days divided by the total number of trading days in a month; its higher 
value signifies greater illiquidity. Disclosed MBS and Post are indicator variables that switch on 
for ISINs whose underlying loans are disclosed under the initiative and for months on or after the 
implementation date of the initiative, respectively. All other variables are defined in Table 1. The 
not-applicable (n/a) designation for fixed effects indicates that the pertinent vector is subsumed 
in the presence of a more restrictive fixed-effects specification. For example, year-month fixed 
effects are not estimated when the model includes lender-year-month fixed effects. The results 
shown in the subsequent tables are from the estimation of the most saturated specification, model 
(4). Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to within-country and year-month correlations as 
well as heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Liquidity Liquidity Liquidity Liquidity   
Disclosed MBS × Post -0.544*** -0.377*** -0.338*** -0.321*** 
  (0.062) (0.049) (0.055) (0.050) 
Disclosed MBS 0.183*** -0.035 -0.066 -0.067 
 (0.052) (0.042) (0.044) (0.040) 
Collateral Amount  0.042*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 
  (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Collateral Balance Factor  0.003* 0.004* 0.004* 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Tranche Amount  -0.044*** -0.049*** -0.048*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Tranche Balance Factor  -0.028 -0.029 -0.044 
  (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) 
Number of Loans  0.097*** 0.094*** 0.091*** 
  (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Nonperforming Collateral  -1.136*** -1.346*** -1.370*** 
  (0.180) (0.195) (0.196) 
Yield  0.016 0.025 0.241 
  (0.528) (0.548) (0.529) 
Rating  0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Loan-to-value  0.102 0.085 0.070 
  (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) 
Age  -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.028*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Remaining Life  -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Return Volatility  -29.328*** -28.966*** -28.562*** 
  (1.562) (1.566) (1.548) 
Observations 40,033 40,033 40,033 40,033 
Adjusted R-squared 0.294 0.469 0.480 0.489 
Country FE Y Y Y Y 
Special-purpose entity FE Y Y Y Y 
Tranche-class FE Y Y Y n/a 
Lender FE Y Y n/a n/a 
Year-month FE Y Y n/a n/a 
Tranche-class × Year-month FE N N N Y 
Lender × Year-month FE N N Y Y 
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Table 4. Mandatory Disclosures and Liquidity—Robustness 
This table presents the results of the difference-in-differences analyses that examine the impact of 
the ECB LLD Initiative on the secondary-market liquidity of mortgage-backed securities. Each 
observation is an ISIN-month. Disclosed MBS and Post are indicator variables that switch on for 
ISINs whose underlying loans are disclosed under the initiative and for months on or after the 
implementation date of the initiative, respectively. The dependent variable, Liquidity, is the first 
principle component of three illiquidity metrics, multiplied by -1 for ease of interpretation. The 
first metric is based on Fong et al. (2017) and computed as 2σN	-1(1+( z 2)⁄ ), where σ is the 
standard deviation of bond returns, N-1 is the inverse function of the cumulative normal 
distribution of the bond return, and z is the portion of zero-returns days. The second metric is 
based on Roll (1984) and calculated as 2ඥ(-Cov (R௧, Rt-1) if Cov < 0 or 0 otherwise, where Rt is 
the bond return. The third metric is the number of nontrading days divided by the total number 
of trading days in a month; its higher value signifies greater illiquidity. In Panel A, the ultra-
senior tranche in column (2) denotes a subsample that includes class “A1.” The sample in column 
(1) is the main sample minus those shown in column (2). In Panel B, column (1) re-estimates the 
main analysis over a 24-month window, instead of the original 48-month window. Column (2) 
shows the result of a treatment intensity test, in which Disclosed MBS is defined as a continuous 
variable, the number of non-missing fields of the LLD report divided by the number of all the 
fields. Column (3) presents the result of the estimation of the main model using a propensity-
score matched (PSM) sample. This sample is constructed using MBS’ observable attributes as at 
2012H1: Collateral Amount, Collateral Balance Factor, Tranche Amount, Tranche Balance 
Factor, Number of Loans, Nonperforming Collateral, Yield, Rating, Loan-to-value, Age, 
Remaining Life, and Return Volatility, which are defined in Table 1 and are used all previous 
controls in the models. In Panel C, the dependent variables are the aforementioned three 
individual components of Liquidity, as indicated in column headings, FHT, Roll, and Nontrading 
days. These are metrics of illiquidity, thus a positive coefficient on Disclosed MBS × Post indicates 
a decline in liquidity, i.e., an increase in illiquidity. In Panel D, the dependent variable is the bid-
ask spread (a measure of illiquidity) and the first principal component of the three main measures 
as well as the bid-ask spread. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to within-country and 
year-month correlations, as well as heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Panel A. Breakdown of Senior Tranches: Safe Securities vs. Ultra-safe Securities 
  (1) (2) 
 
Safe tranche Ultra-safe tranche  
 
Liquidity Liquidity  
  
   
Treatment MBS × Post -0.342*** -0.107 
  (0.048) (0.209) 
Treatment MBS -0.077* -0.410* 
 (0.040) (0.240) 
   
Observations 38,483 1,550 
Adjusted R-squared 0.489 0.571 
All previous controls Y Y 
Country FE & SPE FE Y Y 
Tranche-class × Year-month FE Y Y 
Lender × Year-month FE Y Y 
   
p-value for the difference between  
coefficients in models (1) and (2) 
<0.01 
   
 
Panel B. Specification Robustness 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Narrow Continuous Matched 
 Window Treatment Sample 
 
Liquidity Liquidity Liquidity  
  
    
Treatment MBS × Post -0.427*** -0.379*** -0.129* 
  (0.068) (0.065) (0.073) 
Treatment MBS -0.077 0.011 0.042 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.065) 
    
Observations 22,917 40,033 11,051 
Adjusted R-squared 0.49 0.489 0.525 
All previous controls Y Y Y 
Country FE & SPE FE Y Y Y 
Tranche-class × Year-month FE Y Y Y 
Lender × Year-month FE Y Y Y 
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Panel C. Individual Components of the Liquidity Measure 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Illiquidity 
(FHT) 
Illiquidity  
(Roll) 
Illiquidity 
(Nontrading days)  
  
    
Disclosed MBS × Post 0.116*** 0.128*** 0.051*** 
  (0.021) (0.041) (0.012) 
    
Observations 40,033 40,033 40,033 
Adjusted R-squared 0.388 0.478 0.246 
All previous controls and slopes Y Y Y 
Country FE & SPE FE Y Y Y 
Tranche-class × Year-month FE Y Y Y 
Lender × Year-month FE Y Y Y 
    
 
 
 
Panel D. Alternative Measures of Liquidity 
  (1) (2) 
 
Illiquidity 
(Bid-ask spread) 
Liquidity  
(PCA incl.  
Bid-ask spread) 
 
 
   
Disclosed MBS × Post 0.196* -0.465*** 
  (0.118) (0.080) 
   
Observations 18,845 19,093 
Adjusted R-squared 0.746 0.749 
All previous controls and slopes Y Y 
Country FE & SPE FE Y Y 
Tranche-class × Year-month FE Y Y 
Lender × Year-month FE Y Y 
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Table 5. Mandatory Disclosures and Liquidity—Information Complexity 
This table presents the results of the difference-in-differences analyses that examine the impact of 
the ECB LLD Initiative on the secondary-market liquidity of mortgage-backed securities. Each 
observation is an ISIN-month. The dependent variable, Liquidity, is the first principle component 
of three illiquidity metrics, multiplied by -1 for ease of interpretation. The first metric is based on 
Fong et al. (2017) and computed as 2σN	-1(1+( z 2)⁄ ), where σ is the standard deviation of bond 
returns, N-1 is the inverse function of the cumulative normal distribution of the bond return, and 
z is the portion of zero-returns days. The second metric is based on Roll (1984) and calculated as 
2ඥ(-Cov (R௧, Rt-1) if Cov < 0 or 0 otherwise, where Rt is the bond return. The third metric is the 
number of nontrading days divided by the total number of trading days in a month; its higher 
value signifies greater illiquidity. Disclosed MBS and Post are indicator variables that switch on 
for ISINs whose underlying loans are disclosed under the initiative and for months on or after the 
implementation date of the initiative, respectively. Less complex subsample in column (1) and 
More complex in column (2) denote subsamples constructed based on the complexity of 
information, which is proxied by return volatility, where securities with above-median volatility 
are coded as more complex and vice versa. All previous controls include Collateral Amount, 
Collateral Balance Factor, Tranche Amount, Tranche Balance Factor, Number of Loans, 
Nonperforming Collateral, Yield, Rating, Loan-to-value, Age, Remaining Life, and Return 
Volatility, which are defined in Table 1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to within-
country and year-month correlations, and heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
  (1) (2) 
 
Liquidity Liquidity  
 
Less complex More complex   
   
Disclosed MBS × Post -0.228*** -0.467*** 
 (0.036) (0.075) 
   
Observations 20,019 20,014 
Adjusted R-squared 0.220 0.432 
All previous controls Y Y 
Country FE & SPE FE Y Y 
Tranche-class × Year-month FE Y Y 
Lender × Year-month FE Y Y 
   
p-value for the difference between 
coefficients in models (1) and (2) 
<0.1 
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Table 6. Mandatory Disclosures and Liquidity—Investor Disparity 
This table presents the results of the difference-in-differences analyses that examine the impact of 
the ECB LLD Initiative on the secondary-market liquidity of mortgage-backed securities. Each 
observation is an ISIN-month. The dependent variable, Liquidity, is the first principle component 
of three illiquidity metrics, multiplied by -1 for ease of interpretation. The first metric is based on 
Fong et al. (2017) and computed as 2σN	-1(1+( z 2)⁄ ), where σ is the standard deviation of bond 
returns, N-1 is the inverse function of the cumulative normal distribution of the bond return, and 
z is the portion of zero-returns days. The second metric is based on Roll (1984) and calculated as 
2ඥ(-Cov (R௧, Rt-1) if Cov < 0 or 0 otherwise, where Rt is the bond return. The third metric is the 
number of nontrading days divided by the total number of trading days in a month; its higher 
value signifies greater illiquidity. Disclosed MBS and Post are indicator variables that switch on 
for ISINs whose underlying loans are disclosed under the initiative and for months on or after the 
implementation date of the initiative, respectively. Low disparity in investor sophistication in 
column (1) and High disparity in investor sophistication in column (2) denote subsamples 
constructed based on the standard deviation of investor sophistication, which is measured for each 
MBS investor as the number of MBSs she invests, and correspond to the below and above median 
of the standard deviation, respectively. All previous controls include Collateral Amount, Collateral 
Balance Factor, Tranche Amount, Tranche Balance Factor, Number of Loans, Nonperforming 
Collateral, Yield, Rating, Loan-to-value, Age, Remaining Life, and Return Volatility, which are 
defined in Table 1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to within-country and year-month 
correlations, and heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
  (1) (2) 
 
Liquidity Liquidity  
 
Low disparity 
 in investor  
sophistication 
High disparity 
in investor  
sophistication 
 
 
  
   
Disclosed MBS × Post 0.261 -0.213* 
 (0.159) (0.111) 
   
Observations 5,721 5,744 
Adjusted R-squared 0.483 0.554 
All previous controls Y Y 
Country FE & SPE FE Y Y 
Tranche-class × Year-month FE Y Y 
Lender × Year-month FE Y Y 
   
p-value for the difference between 
coefficients in models (1) and (2) 
<0.01 
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Table 7. Mandatory Disclosures and Liquidity—Equity Tranche 
This table presents the results of the difference-in-differences analyses that examine the impact of 
the ECB LLD Initiative on the secondary-market liquidity of mortgage-backed securities. Each 
observation is an ISIN-month. The dependent variable, Liquidity, is the first principle component 
of three illiquidity metrics, multiplied by -1 for ease of interpretation. The first metric is based on 
Fong et al. (2017) and computed as 2σN	-1(1+( z 2)⁄ ), where σ is the standard deviation of bond 
returns, N-1 is the inverse function of the cumulative normal distribution of the bond return, and 
z is the portion of zero-returns days. The second metric is based on Roll (1984) and calculated as 
2ඥ(-Cov (R௧, Rt-1) if Cov < 0 or 0 otherwise, where Rt is the bond return. The third metric is the 
number of nontrading days divided by the total number of trading days in a month; its higher 
value signifies greater illiquidity. Disclosed MBS and Post are indicator variables that switch on 
for ISINs whose underlying loans are disclosed under the initiative and for months on or after the 
implementation date of the initiative, respectively. The Equity tranche in column (1) denotes a 
subsample that includes below class “D”. The Debt tranche in column (2) denotes a subsample 
that includes class “A” to “D” tranches. All previous control variables include Collateral Amount, 
Collateral Balance Factor, Tranche Amount, Tranche Balance Factor, Number of Loans, 
Nonperforming Collateral, Yield, Rating, Loan-to-value, Age, Remaining Life, and Return 
Volatility, which are defined in Table 1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to within-
country and year-month correlations, and heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
  (1) (2) 
 
Equity tranche 
Debt tranche  
(i.e., main sample) 
 
 
 
Liquidity Liquidity  
  
   
Disclosed MBS × Post 0.784** -0.321*** 
  (0.383) (0.050) 
   
Observations 5,187 40,033 
Adjusted R-squared 0.558 0.489 
All previous controls Y Y 
Country FE & SPE FE Y Y 
Tranche-class × Year-month FE Y Y 
Lender × Year-month FE Y Y 
   
p-value for the difference between  
coefficients in models (1) and (2) 
<0.01 
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Figure 1. Securitization Process
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Figure 2. Evolution of the Trading Liquidity of Treatment vs. Control Securities 
 
This figure presents OLS regression individual half-year coefficient estimates and two-tailed 95% 
confidence intervals, where the dependent variable is Liquidity (as in Table 4). The baseline is the 
year of 2011. 
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